We propose a framework for data-driven pricing in shared vehicle systems (such as bikesharing and carsharing) in which customers can pick up and drop off vehicles in different locations. This framework provides efficient algorithms with rigorous approximation guarantees for a wide class of objective functions (including welfare and revenue), and under a variety of constraints on the prices. An interesting class of constraints accommodated by this framework includes multi-objective settings in which the goal is to maximize some objective function subject to some lower bound on another objective function. An important representative of this class is the Ramsey pricing problem, i.e. maximize revenue subject to some lower bound on welfare.
1 Introduction φ ij . Each customer has a value for the ride drawn independently from a known distribution F ij (·); we assume that F ij (0) = 1, and that F ij has a density f ij that is positive everywhere. Upon arriving she engages a unit if her value is higher than p ij and at least one unit is available at node i; the unit then instantaneously moves from i to j. 2 We assume throughout that nodes have infinite capacity, and that the directed graph defined by {φ ij } is strongly connected.
3
A pricing algorithm takes as input {φ ij , F ij (·)}, and outputs a pricing policy p = {p ij }. Given p, the effective demand stream from i to j (i.e. customers traveling from node i to j with value exceeding p ij ) follows a Poisson process with rate φ ij (p ij ) = φ ij · (1 − F ij (p ij )). Moreover, p also determines the steady-state rate of units moving from node i to j, which is given by ν ij (p, m) = A i,m (p) · φ ij (p ij ), where A i,m (p) is the steady-state availability of units at node i (i.e. the probability in steady-state that at least one unit is present at node i). Finally, given a performance objective that can be written as a sum of non-negative per-ride rewards I ij (p ij ), the steady-state rate of reward accumulation is given by
Our aim is to select p to maximize a given objective. In particular, three canonical objectives we consider are: (i) throughput, where I T ij (p ij ) = 1, (ii) revenue, where I R ij (p ij ) = p ij , and (iii) social welfare, where I W ij (p ij ) = E V ∼Fij [V |V ≥ p ij ]. Our techniques however hold more generally, including in multi-objective settings where, given two different objectives Φ m and Ψ m , we want to compute p so as to maximize Φ m (p) subject to Ψ m (p) ≥ c for some given requirement c.
Roadmap of our Results:
The technical difficulty in solving the maximization problem described above arises from three separate sources of nonlinearity in the optimization problem. First, note that while pricing directly affects the effective demands {φ ij (p ij )}, they also indirectly affect the availability A i,m (p) due to spatial supply dependencies and limited resource constraints. A i,m (p) can be computed via a classical theorem by Gordon and Newell [GN67] , as we discuss in detail in Section 2; however, this involves computing a (price-dependent) normalization constant, which in general has no closed form expression.
While arguing explicitly about A i,m (p) is thus complicated due to the normalization constant, one can try to circumvent this by using structural properties of the {ν ij (p, m)}. In particular, it is easy to see that {ν ij (p, m)} must obey the following for all p and m:
Supply circulation:
∀ i, j ν ji (p, m) = k ν ik (p, m) 2. Demand bounding:
∀ i, j, ν ij (p, m) ≤ φ ij (p ij ) ≤ φ ij 3. Demand proportionality: ∀i, j, ν ij (p, m) ∝ φ ij (p ij )/φ i (p) (where φ i (p) j φ ij (p ij )) Note that though the first two constraints (which follow from simple flow-conservation and capacity arguments), are linear, the third constraint, which follows from the fact that any time a vehicle is available, the next arriving customer's destination is proportional to the effective demands, is nonlinear.
Finally, there may be additional nonlinear constraints imposed endogenously; for example in multiobjective settings, or settings with constraints on allowed prices.
We now outline our framework for tackling these hurdles. For the single-objective maximization problem outlined above, we first circumvent the need to compute the Gordon-Newell normalization constant by instead solving the problem in an appropriate infinite-unit setting, where the normalization constant is available in closed form. In Section 3, we develop guarantees for the finite-unit setting when using a solution computed under the infinite-unit setting. In particular, we prove:
Informal Theorem 1 (Theorem 1 in Section 3). An α-approximate pricing policy (α ≤ 1) for the infinite-unit setting is within an α·r 1+(n−1)/m multiplicative factor 4 of the optimal solution with m units (where r ≤ 1 is a measure of service heterogeneity under p, which equals 1 in several problems we consider).
The proof of Theorem 1 involves an elegant combinatorial argument (Lemma 5), wherein we construct a weighted biregular graph between the state space of an n node system with m units, and an n node system with m − 1 units; this result may be of independent interest. Based on the previous result, we can henceforth focus on optimizing OBJ ∞ (p) in the infinite-unit setting. Though the normalization constant is then computable in closed form, the resulting problem still involves the nonlinear demand-proportionality constraint. However, in Section 4.1, we bypass this via an additional structural result. We say a pricing policy p satisfies the demand circulation property if the resulting effective demands form a circulation, i.e. j φ ji (p ji ) = k φ ik (p ik ) for all i. We then prove: Informal Theorem 2 (Lemma 7 and Theorem 8 in Section 4.1). If all per-ride reward functions I ij (·) are non-decreasing, then there exists an optimal pricing policy that satisfies the demand circulation property; consequently, the constraints form a linear polytope.
Moreover, let q = 1 − F ij (p) be the fraction of customers who want to travel from i to j when p ij = p. If all the price-setting reward curves R ij (q) = q · I ij (F −1 ij (1 − q)) are concave in q, then the resulting objective is concave and can thus be efficiently maximized.
The role of the demand circulation property in removing the nonlinear constraints is explained in Lemma 7. The use of price-setting reward curves is adapted from standard arguments for monopolist pricing (the terminology is adapted from [Har] ).
In multi-objective settings, we have an additional nonlinear constraint to the optimization program in the infinite-unit setting. In Section 4.2, we get around this via a primal-dual method to obtain the following bicriteria approximation guarantee:
Informal Theorem 3 (Theorem 13 in Section 4.2). Let γ = (1 − )/(1 + n−1 m ). For any objective functions Φ(·) and Ψ(·) corresponding to non-decreasing per-ride rewards and concave price-setting reward curves, we can efficiently compute a (γ, γ)-bicriteria approximate pricing policy p for the problem of maximizing Φ m (p) subject to Ψ m (p) ≥ c.
Our approach proceeds as follows: we eliminate the nonlinear constraints using a Lagrangian penalty, and observe that for any Lagrange multiplier, we can efficiently compute a pricing policy that optimizes the Lagrangian objective function in the infinite-unit setting (by Informal Theorem 2). Next, we prove that we can efficiently search over the space of Lagrange multipliers to find two multipliers that are within a small additive distance, such that one of the corresponding pricing policies is feasible but suboptimal and the other is infeasible; however, an appropriate combination of the two results in a solution that is both feasible and provably near-optimal. Thereafter, our infinite-to-finite reduction allows us to obtain the bicriteria guarantee.
In Section 5, we provide various extensions to our results. First, in Section 5.1, we consider a special case where customer value distributions depend only on their source node (i.e. F ij = F i ) and the platform is allowed to only use point prices, in which ∀i, j, k : p ij = p ik . This is motivated by contemporary pricing policies, like surge-pricing. We show that in this case, the optimization problem collapses to a one-dimensional concave maximization. We use this case to highlight how our framework can incorporate additional constraints; in particular, discrete prices, and upper bounds on allowed prices. Thereafter, in Section 5.2 we generalize our main results to settings in which units do not move instantaneously, but instead with delays.
Related work
There is a large literature on characterizing open and closed queueing-network models, building on seminal work of Jackson [Jac63] and Gordon and Newell [GN67] ; the books by Kelly [Kel11] and Serfozo [Ser99] provide an excellent summary. Optimal resource allocation in open queueing networks also has a long history, going back to the work of Whittle [Whi85] . However, there is much less work for closed networks, in part due to the presence of the normalization constant (which though not known in closed-form, is computable in O(nm) time via iterative techniques [Buz73, RL80] ). Most existing work on optimizing closed queueing networks use heuristics, with limited or no guarantees. In contrast, our work focuses on obtaining algorithms with provable guarantees for a wide range of problems, by leveraging techniques from the approximation algorithms [WS11] and mechanism design [Har] literature; for example, our primal-dual method for multi-objective settings draws on a similar approach as for the k-median problem [JV01] .
Two popular approaches for closed queueing-network optimization which admit approximation guarantees are: (i) using open network approximations, and (ii) exogenously imposing the demand circulation constraint. The former approach was formalized by Whitt [Whi84] , via the fixed-population-mean (FPM) method, where exogenous arrival rates are chosen to ensure the mean population is m. It has since been used in many applications; for example, Brooks et al. [BKM13] use it to derive policies for matching debris-removal vehicles to routes following natural disasters. Performance guarantees however are available only in restricted settings.
More recently, heuristics based on enforcing the demand circulation property (variously referred to as the demand rebalancing/fairness/bottleneck property) have been gaining popularity. In transportation settings, these have been used to optimize weighted throughput [Geo12] , as well as to minimize rebalancing costs [ZP16] . Most works typically only provide asymptotic guarantees [GXS12] .
One exception to this is the work of Waserhole and Jost [WJ14] , who provide a pricing policy for maximizing throughput in closed queueing networks, with the same approximation ratio we obtain. They do this via a different argument wherein they observe that, under demand circulation, the Markov chain is doubly stochastic, and hence has a uniform distribution. A i,m (p) can then be computed to be m/(m+n−1) via a simple counting argument (as noted earlier by Whitt [Whi84] ); we prove a generalization of this result in section 5.2. Further, they use that the maximum throughput under any policy is bounded by the maximum demand circulation (which follows from the demand bounding property), and hence the maximum throughput under demand circulation is within a m/(m + n − 1) factor of the optimum. This argument however depends on the fact that for throughput, the per-ride reward function is linear in q, and hence can not be extended. Our approach circumvents this via the infinite-to-finite reduction. Moreover, our combinatorial approach in Lemma 4 allows us to get estimates for A i,m (p) in settings which do not have demand circulations (e.g., when prices are discrete or bounded; cf. Section 5.1), and can also be extended to other closed queueing models (cf. Section 6).
Finally, we note that there is a parallel line of work which tackles settings with dynamic arrivals and pricing, using techniques from approximate dynamic programming [Ade07, LR10, HMW09] . These typically can deal only with small systems, as their dimensionality scales rapidly with the number of stations; moreover, many of the techniques have no provable guarantees.
Preliminaries
Basic setting: We consider a closed queueing network consisting of m units and n nodes. At time t ≥ 0, the state X(t) = (X 1 (t), . . . , X n (t)) tracks the number of units X i (t) present at each node i. S n,m = {(x 1 , x 2 , . . . , x n ) ∈ N n 0 | i x i = m} denotes the state space of the system. We henceforth suppress the dependence on t for ease of notation.
We consider state-independent 5 , point-to-point pricing policies, where we charge p ij for a ride from i to j. In the absence of prices, customers wanting to travel between nodes i and j arrive at node i according to a Poisson process of rate φ ij . Each customer traveling from i to j has a value drawn independently from a distribution F ij (·); we assume that F ij (0) = 1, and that F ij has a density f ij that is positive everywhere. A customer engages a ride iff her value exceeds p ij and at least one unit is available at node i, else she leaves the system. We define q ij (p ij ) = 1 − F ij (p ij ) to be the quantile corresponding to price p ij , i.e. the fraction of customers going from i to j who desire service (note that p ij = F −1 ij (1 − q ij )). Thus, given pricing policy p, the effective stream of passengers arriving at i with destination j follows a Poisson process with rate φ ij (p) = φ ij q ij (p ij ).
We note that throughout most of this work, we assume that rides between stations occur without delay, i.e. when a customer engages a bike to travel from s to t, then the state changes instantaneously from X to X − e s + e t , 6 i.e. a unit is moved from s to t. Closed queueing-network models can also be used to model delays by introducing infinite server queues between nodes; our techniques can be extended to these models as well, as we discuss in Section 5.2. Steady-state flow of units: We define ν ij (p, m) to be the steady-state average rate of units moving from i to j under p in the m-unit system. As mentioned in Section 1.1, these rates are constrained to obey the (linear) supply circulation and demand bounding constraints, as well as the nonlinear demand proportionality constraint. However, we can compute them parametrically as follows:
We define φ i (p) = j φ ij (p) to be the total arrival rate at i, and λ ij (p) = φ ij (p)/φ i (p) to be the routing probabilities under p; similarly, in the absence of prices, we have φ i = j φ ij and λ ij = φ ij /φ i . Next, given {λ ij (p)} i,j∈ [n] , i.e. the routing probability matrix under p, we define w(p) to be its associated invariant distribution, i.e. w(p) satisfies w i (p) = j∈[n] w j (p)λ ji for all i ∈ [n] and i w i (p) = 1. Since {λ ij (p)} i,j∈[n] is a stochastic matrix (i.e. j λ ij (p) = 1), Markov chain theory states that w(p) exists, and is unique if the directed graph defined by the routing probability matrix is strongly connected.
7 We now define r i (p) = w i (p)/φ i (p) as the traffic intensity at node i under p.
Note that {w i (p)} and the traffic intensities {r i (p)} are completely determined by the pricing policy p (via the routing probabilities λ ij (p)), and are independent of m. Moreover, by construction, the flows {w i (p)λ ij (p)} satisfy supply circulation, demand bounding and demand proportionality constraints. Finally, we have that
, where κ(m) is a proportionality constant defined in the next section.
Stationary Distribution: The closed queueing-network model described above is a special case of a closed Jackson network; its steady-state distribution is characterized by a classical theorem by Gordon and Newell [GN67] , as follows: Let π x,m (p) denote the steady state probability for any state x ∈ S n,m , i.e, in the n-node, m-unit system under a pricing policy p. Suppose further that the Markov chain is irreducible; this corresponds to requiring that the directed graph defined by φ ij (p) is strongly connected. Then the Gordon-Newell theorem [GN67] states that:
where
time, but does not have a closed-form expression in general.
From the above result, one can derive 8 that the steady-state availability of units at station i is given
. Also, the steady-state flow of units
The infinite-unit limit: The stationary distribution described above holds for any finite m; moreover, it can also be used to obtain the limiting distribution when the number of units tends to infinity. We now describe this infinite-unit limit; cf. Section 3.7 in [Ser99] for details.
As before, given p we can compute w i (p) and r i (p) (which are independent of m). Define r max = max i r i (p) and r i (p) = r i (p)/r max . Also, let J = {i ∈ [n] | r i (p) = 1} be the set of bottleneck nodes in the network (note that J has at least one element), and K = [n] \ J be the remaining nodes. Then as m → ∞, the stationary distribution of the m-unit setting converges (in a specific technical sense; cf. [Ser99] ) to an infinite-unit limiting distribution, with the following properties: The bottleneck nodes in set J (with r i (p) = 1) all have A i (p) = 1. They feed the non-bottleneck nodes in set K, which form an open Jackson network with each node behaving as a stable M/M/1 queue. Crucially, for all i ∈ K, we have A i (p) = r i (p) < 1. Finally, given a pricing policy p, for any bounded objective function we can define Obj ∞ (p) as in equation 1, such that we have lim m→∞ Obj m (p) = Obj ∞ (p).
Objective function: Given the above model, our goal is to design a pricing policy p to maximize the steady-state performance of the system under various objectives. In particular, we consider objective functions which decompose into per-ride contributions. The general form of the objective function for a system with m units and a pricing policy p is:
Intuitively, the above equation captures that at any node i, customers destined for j arrive at rate φ ij engage a ride if and only if there exists a unit and their value is above the price p ij ; the corresponding ride contributes I ij (p ij ) to the objective function. A formal derivation follows from the 'Poisson Arrivals See Time Averages' (PASTA) property of closed Jackson networks [Kel11] . Further, using notation defined above, the objective function can be written in terms of routing probabilities as:
Finally, the per-ride reward function corresponding to the three canonical objective functions are:
• Throughput: the total rate of rides in the system; for this, we set I T ij (p) = 1.
• Social welfare: the per-ride contribution to welfare is given by
• Revenue: to find the system's revenue rate, we can set I R ij (p) = p ij .
Infinite-to-finite-unit reduction
In this section, we show that any (approximately) optimal pricing policy for the infinite unit setting is approximately optimal for the finite unit setting. This is formalized in the following theorem. Theorem 1. Let p be an α-approximate pricing policy for some maximization objective in the infinite unit setting, i.e. Obj ∞ (p) ≥ α · Opt ∞ . Further, given the traffic intensities {r i (p)}, let r min i r i (p)/ max j r j (p). Then using p in a system with m units results in:
The proof of the theorem is based on a careful examination of how the Gordon-Newell normalizing constant G m (p) affects the system performance with differing numbers of units (Lemma 2). We lower bound the performance of the one-unit system compared to that of the infinite-unit system (via Lemma 3). Then we upper bound the former with respect to the performance in the m-unit setting (via Lemma 4), thereby relating the performance of the m-unit and the infinite-unit systems.
Lemma 2. Let Obj m (p) denote the value of a given objective function under pricing policy p in a system with m units. Then, for any pricing policy p:
Proof. Recall that the steady-state availability at node i equals
. Applying these to equation 3 we obtain
The result follows from rearranging as G 0 (p) = 1.
Lemma 3. For any pricing policy p:
Note that the traffic intensities r j (p) are completely defined by the pricing policy p and the customer flow λ ij , and are independent of the number of units m. The proof is now based on the two observations that i) every summand in the numerator appears in the denominator, and ii) every summand in the denominator appears at most n times in the numerator.
More formally: we can expand the denominator as G m (p) = x∈Sn,m n j=1 (r j (p)) xj , where each summand corresponds to a unique state (x 1 , . . . , x n ) ∈ S n,m . On the other hand, for pairs of states y ∈ S n,m−1 and z ∈ S n,1 , we have that y+z ∈ S n,m . For any x ∈ S n,m , define B x = {(y, z) ∈ S n,m−1 ×S n,1 |x = y + z}. Then the numerator can be simplified to get:
Finally, observe that for any x ∈ S n,m , we have that |B x | ≥ 1 (as there is at least one node i such that x i > 0, we can take y = x − e i , z = e i ). On the other hand, we also have that |B x | ≤ n, as there are at most n nodes with x i > 0. This proves the result.
Lemma 4. For a pricing policy p with min i r i (p)/ max j r j (p) ≥ r:
.
Proof. The crux of the proof lies in the existence of a particular weighted biregular graph between the states in S n,m−1 and the states in S n,m . In this graph, non-zero edges only exist between neighboring states, i.e. between states y ∈ S n,m−1 and y + e i ∈ S n,m ; 9 further, the total weight of edges incident to any state in S n,m is equal to 1, and the total weight of edges incident to any state in S n,m−1 is equal to m+n−1 m
. We construct such a graph in Lemma 5, immediately after this proof.
9 e i denotes the unit vector along i
Throughout this proof, we use s to denote a state in S n,m−1 and t for one in S n,m . The weight of the edge (s, t) in the bipartite graph constructed in Lemma 5 is denoted by ω st .
The second equality holds as s ω st = 1, while the last follows from t ω st = m+n−1 m
. Crucially, ω st > 0 only holds for neighboring states s and t, which implies the inequality. Hence,
Combined with
maxj rj (p) ≥ r, this proves the lemma.
Lemma 5. We call y ∈ S n,m−1 a neighbor of y + e i ∈ S n,m ∀i. There exists a weighted biregular graph on S n,m−1 ∪ S n,m such that i) an edge has non-zero weight only if it is connecting neighboring states, ii) for any vertex corresponding to a state in S n,m−1 the total weight of incident edges is equal to m+n−1 m , and iii) for any vertex corresponding to a state in S n,m the total weight of incident edges is equal to 1.
Proof. Our construction is shown in figure 1. Each state x ∈ S n,m is adjacent to x − e i ∈ S n,m−1 for all i with x i > 0. On these edges, the weight is . Finally, there is only weight on edges between neighboring states. This concludes the proof of the lemma.
(a) Graph between S 2,3 , S 2,2 and S 2,1 (b) Construction for general n, m
Figure 1: Construction of biregular graph between states in S n,m and S n,m−1 , as described in Lemma 5. Fig. 1(a) shows the specific construction for (S 2,3 ,S 2,2 ) and (S 2,2 , S 2,1 ), while Fig. 1(b) shows the general construction. Note that the sum of weights of incident edges for any node on the left (i.e. any state in S n,m ) is 1, while it is (m + n − 1)/m for nodes on the right (i.e. states in S n,m−1 ).
Theorem 1 (restated). Let p be an α-approximate pricing policy for some maximization objective in the infinite unit setting, i.e. Obj ∞ (p) ≥ α · Opt ∞ . Further, if the traffic intensities {r i (p)} satisfy min i r i (p)/ max j r j (p) ≥ r, then using p in a system with m units results in:
The proof consists of three steps. First, ∀m > m:
The first inequality holds by using Lemma 2 (for m) and the lower bound in Lemma 4, while the second inequality follows from using Lemma 2 (for m > m), followed by the upper bound in Lemma 3. Now since the inequality holds for all m > m, we can take limits to get:
Second, for all m > m,
The first inequality holds by monotonicity of the objective function on the number of units. The second inequality holds by the optimality of p * ,m for the m -unit setting. Hence,
Third, by the approximate optimality of p:
Combining inequalities (5), (6), and (7) concludes the proof.
Infinite-unit optimization
Given the infinite-to-finite reduction in the previous section, we can henceforth focus on the infinite unit-setting. In this section, we consider the design of point-to-point pricing policies in the infinite-unit setting, with no additional constraints on the prices. First, we design an efficient algorithm for maximizing any objective function with concave price-setting reward curves. Next, for multi-objective settings, we develop a near-optimal pricing policy via a primal-dual method. Finally, using Theorem 1, we get performance guarantees for our pricing policy in any finite-unit system.
Single-objective optimization
Recall in Section 1.1 we defined a pricing policy p to satisfy the demand circulation property if for all nodes i:
We first prove a general structural lemma about pricing policies satisfying demand circulation and the resulting availabilities:
Lemma 6. For any m (including ∞) and any pricing policy p the following are equivalent 1. p satisfies the demand circulation property 2. The availabilities at all nodes are equal, i.e.
3. The traffic intensities at all nodes are equal, i.e.
Proof. Consider the steady-state rate of flow ν ij (p, m) = A i,m (p)φ ij (p ij ). We know that {ν ij (p, m)} always satisfies the supply circulation property
. Then, dividing both sides of the supply circulation equation by A(p), we get j φ ji (p ji ) = k φ ik (p ik ) ∀ i. Hence {φ ij (p ij )} satisfies the demand circulation property. On the other hand, suppose that p satisfies the demand circulation property, so j φ ji (p ji ) = k φ ik (p ik ) ∀ i. Consider i * ∈ arg max A i,m (p). Then the demand circulation and supply circulation properties imply that
and thus j A i * ,m (p) − A j,m (p) φ ji * (p ji * ) = 0. By choice of i * , each summand is nonnegative, so for each j such that φ ji * > 0 we obtain A j,m = A i * ,m . All availabilities being equal then follows inductively using connectivity of the underlying graph. Moreover, in the infinite-unit setting, we have the following characterization of optimal pricing policies:
Lemma 7. In an infinite unit setting, if all I ij (·) are nondecreasing functions, then there exists an optimal pricing policy p * such that A i,∞ (p * ) = 1 for all i.
Proof. The proof follows from observing that given any optimal pricing policy in the infinite-unit setting, if any node has availability less than 1, then we can increase prices out of that node till it has availability 1, while not affecting any other node in the network, and not decreasing the objective. First, we observe that for any node i, prices {p ij } j and any θ ∈ (0, 1), we can increase prices to {p ij (θ)} j such that φ ij (p ij (θ)) = θφ ij (p ij ) for all j. In particular, we set p ij (θ) = F
Given any optimal policy p * in the infinite-unit setting, we can compute the routing probability matrix {λ ij (p * )} and its invariant distribution {w i (p * )}, and hence traffic intensities r i (p * ) = w i (p * )/φ i (p * ). In the infinite-unit setting, we have that the availability at any node i is given by A i,∞ (p * ) = r i (p * )/r max , where r max = max j∈[n] r j (p * ). Suppose now that there exists a non-bottleneck node k (i.e. with r k (p * ) ≤ r max ). Let θ = r k (p * )/r max < 1, and consider a new pricing policy p where we increase prices {p * kj } j to {p * kj (θ)} j as described above, while keeping all other prices the same. Note that since all routing probabilities {λ ij ( p)} are unchanged, hence
. Thus, we now have A k,∞ ( p) = 1 while all other availabilities A i,∞ ( p), and all flows {ν ij ( p)} remain unchanged. Moreover, since I kj (·) is non-decreasing, Obj ∞ ( p) ≥ Obj ∞ (p * ). We can repeat this for all non-bottleneck nodes.
Lemmas 6 and 7 together show that assuming only non-decreasing per-ride rewards, 10 in the infiniteunit limit, it is sufficient to optimize over policies p * satisfying the demand circulation property. We note though that the projection to the infinite-unit setting is crucial for this; for finite m, one can construct settings where no pricing policy satisfying demand circulation is optimal (cf. [WJ14] for an example in throughput maximization).
We now use the above to reformulate our optimization problem as a concave minimization subject to linear constraints. We follow a standard technique from mechanism design [Har] where we do a change of variables from prices p to quantiles q. Recall we define q ij (p) = 1 − F ij (p) to be the fraction of customers who want to travel from i to j when p ij = p. Given any objective function with per-ride rewards I ij (·), we can define the corresponding price-setting reward curve R ij (q) = q · I ij (F −1
Theorem 8. Consider any objective function, and value distributions such that: (i) all per-ride rewards I ij (p) are non-decreasing in p, and (ii) all price-setting reward curves R ij (q) are concave in q. Then in the infinite unit setting, an optimal pricing policy can be efficiently computed.
Proof. Recall that for any p, we have φ ij (p ij ) = φ ij q ij (p ij ). Consider variables {q ij } obeying q ij ∈ [0, 1]. By Lemmas 6 and 7, we know we can restrict our search to pricing policies p obeying the demand circulation condition, which we can rewrite as:
Note that these constraints form a linear polytope in {q ij }. Moreover, since under this policy we have A i,∞ (p) = 1 ∀ i, therefore from equation 1, we can write the objective function as:
By our second assumption, this is a concave objective function of {q ij }. Thus, the problem now reduces to a concave maximization under linear constraints, which can be efficiently optimized.
Note that the R ij (·) depend both on I ij (·) and also F ij (·); in Appendix B, we show that the conditions in Theorem 8 hold for throughput and social welfare under any value distribution, and for revenue under regular value distributions. Also note that if p obeys demand circulation, then r i (p) = r(p) ∀ i (cf. Lemma 6). Theorems 1 and 8 now combine to give:
Corollary 9. For any objective function and value distributions that satisfy the non-decreasing per-ride rewards and the concave reward curve property, we can efficiently compute a pricing policy which is m/(m + n − 1)-approximately optimal in the finite-unit setting with m units.
Multi-objective optimization
Having efficient algorithms for approximate pricing under general objective functions (Theorems 1 and 8) further allows us to obtain bicriteria approximations in muti-objective settings. First, in the infinite-unit setting, given any two objective functions Φ and Ψ and a requirement c > 0, we want to choose prices p in order to maximize Φ(p) subject to Ψ(p) ≥ c. Let Φ * = sup p Φ(p) and Ψ * = sup p Ψ(p) in the infinite-unit setting. We proceed by proving the following theorem:
Theorem 10. In the infinite-unit setting, given objective functions Φ and Ψ, value distributions {F ij } and a requirement c > 0 such that: (i) for Φ and Ψ, per-ride rewards are non-decreasing and price-setting reward curves are concave, and (ii) Ψ * > (1 + ζ) · c for some ζ > 0. Then for any > 0, we can compute a (1 − )-approximately optimal pricing policy p for maximizing Φ(p) subject to Ψ(p) ≥ c, using O log(Ψ * / ζ 2 ) calls to the concave maximization program in Theorem 8.
Proof. Consider the Lagrangian objective function:
where Λ denotes the Lagrange multiplier. Note first that for any Λ ≥ 0, Φ(·) + ΛΨ(·) satisfies the assumptions of Theorem 8, and hence we can optimize over quantiles q instead of prices p. As before,
Thus, optimizing over feasible circulations ν = {ν ij } is equivalent to optimizing over quantiles q (and hence price-vectors p). This justifies a slight abuse of notation wherein we rewrite the Lagrangian optimization problem as:
For Λ min = 0, the maximization returns a pricing policy that optimizes the objective function Φ(·) with no Lagrangian penalty. If the resulting ν Λmin is such that Ψ(ν Λmin ) ≥ c is satisfied, then ν Λmin corresponds to an optimal pricing policy for the multi-objective setting. In the remainder of the proof, we assume that Ψ(ν Λmin ) < c. Moreover, in Lemma 11, we show that for all Λ > Λ max Φ * /(ζc), we have that any solution ν maximizing the Lagrangian satisfies Ψ(ν) > c.
In the quest of a solution that maximizes Φ(·) subject to the constraint on Ψ(·), we perform binary search on Λ ∈ [Λ min , Λ max ]. Note that for any Λ < Λ , the corresponding maximizing circulations ν and ν satisfy Φ(ν) ≥ Φ(ν ) and Ψ(ν) ≤ Ψ(ν ). For our binary search, we maintain (Λ 1 , Λ 2 ) and their corresponding solutions (ν 1 , ν 2 ) such that Λ 1 < Λ 2 and Ψ(ν 1 ) < c and Ψ(ν 2 ) ≥ c. Let > 0 be a small number we later define. We stop the binary search when either Ψ(ν i ) = c, i ∈ {1, 2} or Λ 2 ≤ Λ 1 + ; note that this takes at most log(Λ max / ) iterations. If at termination, either Ψ(ν) = c for either ν 1 or ν 2 , then we return the corresponding solution. Else, we choose θ ∈ (0, 1) such that θΨ(ν 1 ) + (1 − θ)Ψ(ν 2 ) = c, define ν = θν 1 + (1 − θ)ν 2 (which is a convex combination of two circulations, and hence a valid circulation, i.e. ν satisfies capacity constraints and flow conservation), and return the pricing policy p corresponding to ν.
To complete the proof, we need to show that ν is feasible (i.e. Ψ( ν) ≥ c), and Φ( ν) is approximately optimal. For the former, since Ψ(·) is concave, we have Ψ( ν) ≥ θΨ(ν 1 ) + (1 − θ)Ψ(ν 2 ) = c via Jensen's inequality. For the latter, since Φ(·) is concave, we can again apply Jensen's to get: Φ( ν) ≥ θΦ(ν 1 ) + (1 − θ)Φ(ν 2 ). Now let Opt be the optimal solution to the multi-objective problem. From weak duality, we have Opt ≤ L(Λ 1 ) and Opt ≤ L(Λ 2 ), and so Opt ≤ θL(Λ 1 ) + (1 − θ)L(Λ 2 ). Now we have: Proof. Let ν 1 be the demand circulation corresponding to Φ * and ν 2 be the demand circulation corresponding to Ψ * . Also, letθ be such thatθΨ * = c (henceθ ≤ 1/(1 + ζ)), and defineν =θν 1 + (1 −θ)ν 2 . This is a valid solution of the problem as, by Jensen inequality, Ψ(ν) ≥θΨ(ν 1 ) + (1 −θ)Ψ(ν 2 ) ≥ c. Hence, a lower bound on its value is a lower bound on the optimum. Again, applying Jensen's inequality and the fact that 1 −θ ≥ ζ 1+ζ Φ * , we obtain a lower bound of
Finally, projecting back to finite m, we get the follwing bicriteria approximation:
Corollary 13. Let γ = m(1 − )/(m + n − 1). For any objective functions Φ(·) and Ψ(·) satisfying the concave price-setting reward curve condition and Ψ * > c in the infinite unit setting, a (γ, γ)-bicriteria approximation pricing policy for the problem of maximizing Φ m (ν) subject to Ψ m (ν) ≥ c can be efficiently computed, i.e.: with Opt denoting the optimal solution to the multi-objective optimization problem, the returned solution ν satisfies Φ m (ν) ≥ γ · Opt and Ψ m (ν) ≥ γ · c.
Proof. We solve the problem in the infinite unit setting and get a solution ν such that Φ ∞ ( ν) ≥ (1− )Opt ∞ subject to Ψ ∞ ( ν) ≥ c. Applying Theorem 1 in the constraint, we get that, in the finite setting, this corresponds to Ψ m ( ν) ≥ c/γ. Also, similarly as in the proof of Theorem 1, we obtain that Φ( ν) ≥ 1− γ Opt m , which completes the proof.
Extensions

Point pricing
In this section, we focus on a special case where the platform is only allowed to set prices based on the source node, and the value distributions of all customers arriving at a node are identical (i.e. p ij = p i and F ij (·) = F i (·) for all i, j). We provide a simple optimal pricing policy for the infinite unit setting, which involves just one eigenvector computation (for throughput/social welfare) followed by a concave maximization over a single variable (for revenue).
We then examine settings where prices have additional external restrictions, namely that they come from a discrete price set, or restrictions on the maximum price. Using our infinite-to-finite unit reduction, all our results are then translated back to the finite unit setting. We emphasize that in these restricted settings, there is often no feasible solution satisfying demand circulation 11 ; consequently, we need to use Theorem 1 in its more general form (by providing bounds on {r i (p)}).
Unrestricted price set: Before adding further restrictions, we provide the point pricing equivalent to Theorem 8 to obtain an optimal pricing policy for this setting. To do so we first prove a lemma similar to Lemma 7.
Lemma 14. For any objective function with nondecreasing I i (·), there exists an optimal point pricing policy in the infinite-unit setting where the traffic intensities in all the nodes are the same, i.e. min i r i (p)/ max i r i (p) = 1.
Proof. Let p be an optimal pricing policy in which min i r i (p) < max i r i (p). Let j be a node such that r j (p) < max i r i (p). As in Lemma 7, we increase the price at j to obtainp with r j (p) = max i r i (p) = max i r i (p). Since the routing probabilities are fixed in the point pricing setting, w i (p) = w i (p) for every node i. All φ i (p) (other than φ j (p)) have not been affected and all flows {ν ij (p)} remain unchanged and the per-ride rewards are either unchanged or have increased. Thus, Obj ∞ (p) ≥ Obj ∞ (p). Repeating this step for all j with r j (p) < max i r i (p) the result follows.
Theorem 15. Given any objective function, and point value distributions such that: (i) all per-ride rewards I i (p) are non-decreasing in p, and (ii) all price-setting reward curves R i (q) are concave in q. Then in the infinite unit setting, an optimal point pricing policy can be efficiently computed.
Proof. Given the restriction on prices and the assumption on value distributions, λ ij (p) = λ ij for any point pricing policy p. The prices thus do not change w i (p) and we may compute w, the invariant distribution of the routing matrix {λ ij }. By Lemma 14, there exists an optimal point pricing policy p such that for all i, j: r i (p) = r j (p). As r i (p) = w i /φ i (p) this implies that we can express all prices as a function of a single one and the problem becomes an one-dimensional concave maximization problem.
For the special cases of throughput and social welfare, this concave maximization problem does not need to be solved as it is guaranteed that there exists an optimal solution p and a node i such that p i = 0. For throughput, this holds as the reward curve of throughput is equal to the corresponding quantile and hence decreasing with price. For social welfare, this holds as the reward curve corresponds to the expected value times the identifier that the value is greater than the price, which is again decreasing with price. Hence, instead of solving the concave maximization problem one can sort nodes in decreasing order of w i /φ i in decreasing order. Then p 2 , . . . , p n are increasing functions of p 1 (as we may assume that r i (p) = r j (p) for all i and j) and writing the objective as in section 4 as
we notice that setting p 1 = 0 (i.e.: 1 − F (p i ) = 1) is optimal.
Discrete price set: We now show how the above pricing policy can be modified when there is a discrete set of available prices for each node. We handle this case with an extra loss in the objective that depends on how well the prices represent each part of the distribution. The resulting solution is not a demand circulation but the ratio between traffic intensities can be bounded. Crucially for our bound not to be infinite, the price set should have a member upper bounding the price returned by the infinite unit system. The bound we obtain depends on an upper bound of their distance. We again label the nodes in decreasing order of w i /φ i . 
In the resulting solution,
Proof. We first solve the unrestricted setting to get an optimal or near-optimal pricing policy p o . Then, for each node i, we select p i for the minimum such that β i (p i ) ≤ β i (p Upper bounds on prices: We now turn our attention to cases where there are upper bounds on the prices that can be charged at any node. The next theorem provides an optimal pricing policy for this setting. Similarly as above, the solution is no longer circulation but there is an upper bound on the maximum ratio between traffic intensities. Theorem 17. Let p U i be the upper bound on the price for node i and p be an optimal price vector in the unrestricted infinite-unit setting. Then, for any objective function that satisfies the non-decreasing per-ride reward and concave price-setting reward curve properties, a pricing policy p with an approximation guarantee of
in the infinite-unit setting can be efficiently computed. We remark that in the case of throughput,
Proof. Applying Theorem 15, we obtain the unrestricted solution p that is an upper bound on the objective in the infinite unit setting. This may be infeasible as we do not enforce that ∀i :
we obtain a feasible price vector p . In rounding no r j (p) has decreased (as φ i (p) were only increased). On the other hand, each I i has decreased by a factor of at most
Ii(p) . The traffic intensities, all equal under policy p, at nodes i at which the price was rounded have changed by at most
Incorporating travel-times between nodes
Finally, in this section, we discuss how we can remove the assumption that units move instantaneously between nodes, by incorporating transition times between stations.
System model: A standard way to incorporate transition delays is to assume that each unit transitions from node i to j after an exponentially-distributed random time, with mean τ ij . Formally, we expand the network state to X = {X i (t), X ij (t)}, where node queues X i (t), as before, track the number of available units at node i, and link queues X ij (t) track the number of units in transition between nodes i and j. When a customer engages a unit to travel from i to j, the state changes from X i → X i − 1 and X ij → X ij + 1; X j however does not change. The unit remains in the X ij queue for time Exp(1/τ ij ), independent of other units; 12 when it exits, the state changes from X ij → X ij − 1 and X j → X j + 1. Finally, we assume that the pricing policies and passenger-side dynamics remain the same as before; in particular, we assume that the demand elasticities and the per-ride rewards are independent of the actual transit times (any dependence on the average times τ ij is assumed to be contained in φ ij , F ij (·)).
The system described above is a special case of the so-called BCMP networks (cf. [Ser99] , Section 3.3; also cf. [ZP16] for a similar model). Thus, X ij (t) corresponds to an infinite-server queue (in this case, M/M/∞ queue), with service rate 1/τ ij . The steady-state distribution of such a network again admits a product-form expression, i.e. it can be written as a product of terms, one for each queue. In particular, suppose we define the w(p) as before (i.e. as the invariant distribution of the routing probability matrix under p). Note that the steady-state flow of units from i to j is ν ij (p, m) = κ(m) · (w i (p)λ ij (p)); this is thus the input rate of the X ij queue, where κ(m) again denotes a normalizing constant. Moreover, we define the traffic intensities at the nodes as:
The BCMP theorem (cf. [Ser99] ) then states that
where G m (p) is the BCMP normalizing constant. Finally, for the infinite-unit system, as before we define r i (p) = r i (p)/(max i r i (p)), and define J = {i ∈ [n] | r i (p) = 1} to be the set of bottleneck nodes; note that the link nodes are always nonbottleneck nodes (essentially as they are stable for any finite input rate). Now, as m → ∞, the stationary distribution of the m-unit setting converges to an infinite-unit limiting distribution wherein all bottleneck nodes in set J have A i (p) = 1, and feed a set of non-bottleneck queues consisting of stable M/M/1 queue (for non-bottleneck nodes) and M/M/∞ queues (for the link queues). Moreover, the state of the link queues is independent of all the node queues, and also does not affect the steady-state objective function.
One immediate consequence of the above characterization is that, in the infinite-unit system, adding link queues does not affect the optimization problems we consider (wherein each ride accrues a per-ride reward based on its price). Thus all results for the infinite-unit setting (in particular, Theorems 8 and 10) hold for any (bounded) transit time distributions. The main challenge in incorporating transition delays is thus how using the optimal pricing policy for the infinite-unit setting performs in the m-unit setting with transit times.
Pricing with transition delays under demand circulation: We now show that given any pricing policy that satisfies the demand circulation property, the ratio between its performance in the infinite-unit system and in the m-unit system is lower bounded by a factor of m m+n−1 · (1 − o(1) ). First, we observe that Lemma 6 continues to hold when we incorporate transition delays; this follows from the fact that the proof relies only on the supply circulation property, which continues to hold with transition delays. Moreover, let M denote the random variable corresponding to the steady-state number of available (i.e. not in transit) units across all nodes, and define
Now we have the following Lemma:
Lemma 18. Consider an n-node m-unit system with parameters {φ ij , F ij (·)} and pricing policy p that satisfies the demand circulation property, and under which the resulting network is strongly-connected. Then, conditioned on M , the distribution of available bikes is uniform on S n,M , and furthermore
Proof. As argued above, Lemma 6 shows that under any pricing policy p that satisfies the demand circulation property, the traffic intensities at all nodes are the same, i.e. r i (p) = r(p). Define x| [n] = (x 1 , . . . , x n ) to denote the state x of the system restricted to the nodes and similarly x| [n] 2 to denote the state of the system restricted to the link queues. From equation 10, we obtain for a state y of the Markov chain:
where in the last equality, we use r i (p) = r(p) (and hence
, and note that the term in the middle braces corresponds to some function H(p, k) that only depends on k and p and not on y| [n] . Abusing notation, we define the (random) set
Then from above we have that all states x ∈ S n,M have identical positive probabilities, 13 while all other states have probability 0. Finally, since |S n,M | =
Using this, we can present the main result in this section:
Theorem 19. Consider a network with transition delays, parametrized by {φ ij , F ij (·), τ ij }. Let p be an α-approximate pricing policy for some maximization objective in the infinite unit setting. Moreover, suppose p obeys the demand circulation property. Then using p in a system with m units results in:
Notice that for every two states y and z with i∈[n] 
To complete the proof, we now need to bound the steady-state availability at nodes. Now we can write 
Next, we note that the link queues {X ij } can be sample-pathwise stochastically dominated by independent M/M/∞ queues { X ij } with input rate φ ij λ ij (p) and average transition time τ ij . This follows from a simple coupling argument, where we associate each incoming customer (who by definition follow independent Poisson processes of rate φ ij λij(p)) with a virtual unit, irrespective of whether the customer actually got a unit or not in the real system. Let D = i,j X ij ; from the above stochastic dominance,
. Finally, since X ij ∼ P oi(φ i λ ij (p)τ ij ), we have E D = i,j φ i λ ij (p)τ ij ≤ i,j φ i τ ij . Substituting above we get our result.
Conclusions
We have presented a formal framework for point-to-point pricing in closed queueing networks, with a particular focus on applications in shared vehicle systems. One future direction of interest is to try and extend our techniques to optimal state-dependent pricing policies. Moreover, extending our work on point pricing (with additional pricing constraints) to point-to-point settings also remains an open question. Finally, although many interesting system objectives fulfill the assumptions of our techniques, there are others (e.g.: consumer surplus) that do not. Developing approximation algorithms for them is a direction of future research.
Proof. To prove the theorem we repeatedly add flow to edges e with ν e = 0, but also take flow away from edgesē with νē > 0. To ensure that edges of the second kind do not have their flow reduced by too much, we set δ = k × min min i,j {ν ij : ν ij > 0}, min i,j {φ i λ ij : λ ij > 0} .
Whenever we decrease flow on an edge, this is done by an additive δ amount. Reducing flow at most k times to obtain ν ij we guarantee that ν ij ≥ (1 − )ν ij holds.
As we assume our underlying graph with edge-set {(u, v) : λ uv > 0} to be strongly connected, it must be the case that there exists a minimal sequence of components C 1 , C 2 , . . . , C d = C 1 , d > 2, and nodes u i , v i ∈ C i such that λ uivi+1 > 0, but ν uivi+1 = 0. In particular, it being minimal implies that no component other than the first appears repeatedly.
Since each u i , v i are in the same strongly connected component of the graph with edge-set E, we know that for each i there exists a simple path from u i to v i with positive flow on it. We change flows as follows: for all pairs (u i , v i+1 ) we increase flow by δ and for each edge e along the path from u i to v i we decrease flow by δ. At all other edges the flow remains unchanged.
We need to first argue that the new circulation is feasible. Each node along a path within a component has its in-flow and out-flow reduced by δ, whereas at the nodes u i , v i both the sum of in-flows and the sum of out-flows has remained the same. At all other nodes, nothing is altered. Thus, flow conservation continues to hold. By choice of δ none of the edge-capacities are violated. Thus, the resulting flow is a circulation with at most k − 1 distinct components. Applying this procedure k − 1 times, we obtain a single strongly connected component.
Finally, since I ij (·) are nondecreasing with price and decreasing flow is equivalent to increasing prices, the choice of δ guarantees that the objective on paths from u i to v i has been reduced by at most a factor of (1 − ). Since I ij (·) are non-negative, the additional flow on edges from u i to v i+1 only increases the total objective. Thus, the pricing policy p that induces the circulation ν has the desired properties.
B Concave Price-Setting Reward curves
In this appendix we investigate conditions under which throughput, social welfare and revenue satisfy the conditions of theorem 8. Proof. We drop the subscripts throughout this proof to simplify notation. We begin by considering revenue, for which the result holds due to the fact that the price setting regular curve is concave if and only if the distribution is regular (cf. Proposition 3.10 in [Har] ). For throughput, R(q(p)) = q(p) · I(p) = q(p) is a linear function of q(p) for any value distribution and thus concave.
Lastly, for social welfare, we use the notion of hazard rate h(y) = f (y) 1−F (y) . With slight abuse of notation, let p = p(q) and q = q(p). By the definition of hazard rate:
h(y)dy
Taking logarithms and differentiating, we obtain: h(p(q)) dp(q) dq = − 1 q Hence, as R(q) = q · I(p(q)) we have R(q) = dq 2 = dp(q) dq = − 1 qh(p(q)) = − 1 − F (p) f (p)q < 0.
